Labor arkets SOME THIRTY-FIVE years after the major growth in unions in the United States, the literature on inflation reveals no consensus over the role of collective bargaining in wage inflation. The contrast between the ambivalence of the professional literature toward union influence and the concern of policy officials with the development of negotiated wages seems particularly acute during the biennial and triennial renegotiations of labor contracts in important industries. Most nonprofessional observers of these "wage rounds" would be surprised to learn that they apparently lead no life of their own in many wage-adjustment models. The lack of explicit attention to union activity in many models usually rests on one of two standard justifications. First, unlike those in other industrialized nations, labor unions in the United States represent a relatively small fraction of the labor force, leading some authors to assume that events in the organized sector would have little effect on the general level of money wages. Second, standard formulations of price theory predict that unions that succeed in monopolizing labor supply will achieve a once-and-for-all relative-wage advantage but will have no long-term inflationary influence. Therefore, changes in the degree of labor market monopoly will influence the rate of wage inflation, but unions should not exert an independent influence once that degree becomes stable. (Even Taken at face value, this argument seems to justify neglect of the role of collective bargaining in postwar inflation in the United States, for the extent of unionization has been quite stable over this period. The main dynamic element has been the spread of unionization among public employees, which has essentially offset a relative decline in the private sector, where employment has grown most rapidly in occupations and geographic areas that are not traditional bastions of union strength.
This paper examines the issue of the interdependence of negotiated wages in the United States, and analyzes wage interactions between the union and nonunion sectors. It departs, therefore, from previous studies in certain respects. Most important, wage interdependence is viewed from the perspective of labor markets as defined by contractual relationships. Studies of aggregate changes in earnings, particularly those that are mute on the role of unions, obscure important differences in the process of wage adjustment under different market structures or contractual arrangements. This treatment conflicts with the disaggregations emphasized in some modern theories of inflation.4
Some earlier studies have examined wage interdependence among geographic labor markets, focusing on the role of potential migration in the pattern of wage change across regions. Others have tested for interindustry wage spillovers.5 The former rely on more or less competitive processes and do not consider contractual relationships, which frequently cut across the geographic boundaries by which data are organized. The latter may reflect contractual relationships, but suffer because in using earnings data, they combine wage adjustments in the union and the nonunion sectors although the differences in the contractual relationships are generally so great that the wage-adjustment process for the two could differ substantially. Moreover, the use of earnings data combines movements in contractual wages and wage drift. The analysis in this paper is confined to the former class of adjustments.
The subsequent sections pursue the issue of wage interdependence. First, the pressures for imitation are briefly reviewed, and an extreme view of the spillover process-that all wage changes are the same-is assessed by a comparison of the distributions of wage change for union and nonunion workers. This is followed by regression analyses of interactions between union and nonunion wage changes, which include an assessment of the impact of the Nixon administration's incomes policy on union and In the literature on industrial relations, discussions of movements in union wages have long emphasized the role of "custom" or "coercive comparisons" in maintaining stable relative wages among various skills, occupations, and industries. However, the focus on wage developments in the unionized sectors has obscured the role of wage imitation in unorganized markets. Wage similarity among firms competing in the same product and labor markets is no less than what economic theory predicts. An employer can, of course, postpone wage adjustments until the market signals that his wage is higher or lower than desired (for example, by an increase in the applicant or quit rate). However, a firm may find it cheaper to maintain its relative position by imitating the wage changes in "reference" firms in the relevant product and labor markets. This is the behavior underlying equilibrium-wage movements in many job-search models; empirically, it explains why many nonunion firms subscribe to and participate in wage surveys of their industry. Among many nonunion firms, wage imitation and the resulting wage pattern simply economize on personnel costs., On the union side, the motivations are more complicated. The union leadership is presumed to gain utility from both higher wages and more employment of the membership. Under this formulation, union leaders may, to the extent necessary to preserve union membership, share the employer's perspective on the appropriate range of wage comparisons. The rank and file, however, is likely to emphasize traditional wage relationships in the development of bargaining positions. The perspective of the rank and file follows from a straightforward consideration of losses and gains under alternative bargaining strategies. Most members will gain from the maintenance of traditional wage differentials if this justifies increasing wages; only a few will lose their jobs from subsequent adjust- Clearly, the problems and possibilities of wage distortion in a system of wage imitation or pattern following develop only when employers and unions form different wage references and when the union dominates in bargaining. Even in the unionized sector, institutional arrangements are sufficiently diverse that rigid wage imitation is difficult. The influence of market forces should be even greater in the nonunion sector. Yet some discussions of wage determination come close to maintaining that once wages are settled in a few key sectors, wage changes are largely determined for the rest of the economy. In this section, the merit of this rigid (naive) hypothesis of wage interdependence is assessed by examining data on the dispersion of wage changes in the union and nonunion sectors of manufacturing. In subsequent sections, less stringent wage-imitation hypotheses will be examined.
Only one source appears to provide separate time series of union and nonunion wage changes in the United States. The wage series are a product of the survey, Wage Developments in Manufacturing, of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data, restricted to total manufacturing, are published annually in the Bureau's Current Wage Developments. The union wage changes are obtained from data for major collective bargaining agreements (covering at least 1,000 workers) and a sample of smaller union establishments. The nonunion data cover general wage increases in a sample of nonunion establishments, which give either general increases alone or a combination of general and merit increases. Thus, for some firms in the sample, the omission of merit increases means that the data understate total wage changes. Establishments that grant merit increases only or that adjust wages on an individual basis are not included.7
7. The weighted average of union and nonunion wage changes in the survey, Wage Developments in Manufacturing, typically falls below the rate of change of hourly earnings (adjusted for overtime and interindustry employment shifts). In- These data have an important bearing on the naive wage-interdependence hypothesis. If pattern following dominates wage determination within the union sector but "threat" influences (spillovers to the nonunion sector) are weak, the dispersion of wage adjustments should be smaller for organized workers than for unorganized workers. Unfortunately, the data are too thin to provide a conclusive test of wage interactions between the union and nonunion sectors or between union settlements in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing, or of a less rigid wage interdependence among unions within the manufacturing sector. These topics are pursued in subsequent sections.
The distribution of effective annual wage changes by union affiliation appears in table 1.8 Since most unions in manufacturing are not free to adjust their wages annually (except via predetermined deferred increases) and because the loading of wage increases over the contract period may creases in earnings above contractual wage-rate changes in the union sector-the wage-drift factor-are one source of the gap. Furthermore, as noted in the text, nonunion wage changes are understated to an unknown extent in the data in Wage Developments in Manufacturing since the survey does not record merit increases that are granted in addition to general wage increases in nonunion firms. See Diane C. vary, three-year averages are presented. The table reveals the inadequacy of the naive version of rigid wage interdependence. In the data underlying these computations, union workers received wage increases amounting to as little as zero and as much as 10 percent in the early years of the period and, more recently, ranging from zero to over 13 percent. While this hardly rules out spillovers, it pretty well undermines the view that current wage adjustments among organized workers play the rigid game of follow the leader that characterized a few wage rounds early in the postwar years.9
The coefficients of variation in table 1 also show that the dispersion of nonunion wage changes in manufacturing around the median wage increase exceeds the dispersion of union wage changes-a finding that is consistent with greater wage interdependence among groups of unionized workers, although the test is hardly a strong one. (A comparison of the two dispersion measures in table 1 indicates that the growth in the median wage increase over the period is responsible for the marked decline in the coefficient of variation.) Closer scrutiny of the underlying data reveals that virtually all the difference is due to the greater frequency of zero increases in the nonunion sector in most years. This frequency is quite sensitive cyclically. Thus, the percent of nonunion workers receiving positive wage changes rose from a low of 54 in 1961 (the union figure was 83.3) to a high of 90.1 in 1973 (when the union figure was 95.9). When workers receiving no wage change are ignored in the computations, the dispersion of wage increases is generally somewhat greater in the union sector.'0 9. This conclusion holds if one focuses instead on absolute wage changes or wage and benefit changes. It also corresponds with early case studies of wage settlements within the jurisdiction of major unions. Indeed, the most interesting finding of the literature on wage contagion in the fifties was the apparent fragility of wage patterns. Even within the jurisdiction of the United Automobile Workers or the United Steelworkers, wages typically deviated from the pattern in response to unfavorable economic conditions. However, these deviations occurred only in the smaller plants and deviations were more frequent in fringe benefits and work-rule enforcement than in wages. Harold M. 10. For the record, downward wage flexibility is virtually unheard of in employment contracts in either sector. Even in the economic doldrums of the early sixties, general wage decreases were never experienced by more than 0.1 percent of union workers and 0.4 percent of nonunion workers in any year. These data (from the The results of this section are easily summarized. The naive wage-interdependence hypothesis of thoroughgoing imitation fails decidedly as a description of wage determination in both the union and the nonunion sectors of manufacturing. While students of labor markets have long recognized that strong tendencies toward imitation in the determination of official job rates are consistent with significant interfirm and interindustry variation in the rate of change of actual earnings (via wage drift), the data reviewed in the section show that even changes in negotiated union wage rates exhibit significant variation and in some years do not differ substantially from the dispersion of changes in nonunion wages. If contagion occurs, it apparently does not reach epidemic proportions.
Nevertheless, this version of the contagion hypothesis could well be regarded as a caricature of institutional wage interdependencies. It does not rule out some less stringent form of wage influence among groups of union workers. In fact, the somewhat lower and less cyclically sensitive dispersion in the organized sector suggests some role for alternative hypotheses of wage interdependence. Nor do the findings rule out the possibility that, for a given dispersion, the size of money-wage changes in these sectors is subject to wage developments elsewhere. These possibilities are examined below.
Spilovers among Major Sectors
Since the spread of unionization in the late thirties and early forties, it has often been assumed that movements in union wages are relatively insulated from labor market pressure and hence from the influence of macroeconomic policy. Although some studies of aggregate earnings have derived empirical support for this proposition,": there is no consensus as to the institutional factors that might be responsible. A clearer understanding of why a recession may not put much "bite" on union wages seems desirable before standard monetary and fiscal policies are supplemented by auxiliary policies aimed at moderating wage increases.
There are several potential explanations of cyclically insensitive wage Finally, union wage demands may be influenced by "equity" considerations as well as current market conditions. Where the equity objective takes the form of maintaining a target relative wage and where the relativewage patterns tend to be disturbed before a deflationary period, macroeconomic policy may not have much influence on even currently negotiated wages. To the extent that nonunion employers seek to maintain a differential with the union sector, the insulation of wages from market stimuli could spread throughout the economy. If this form of wage interdependence is important, a crucial empirical issue is the speed with which wages adjust to reestablish the target differential. The empirical analysis in this section seeks to establish the weight to be accorded these alternatives and their role in recent wage behavior. Wage determination is examined separately for the union and nonunion sectors in an effort to describe more fully the differences in the underlying behavior, and to bring out interactions that are obscured in the earnings data. In evaluating the results, it should be recognized that observed earnings changes are not a simple weighted average of wage changes in the union and nonunion sectors. To clarify the relation between the analysis in this section and standard wage-adjustment models using earnings as the dependent variable, consider In principle, wage imitation can influence any component of equation 1, and thus reduce the responsiveness of earnings changes to changes in macroeconomic policy. However, the empirical tests in this paper are restricted to spillovers influencing WI' and WI", as well as wage relationships within the unionized sector. Although the size of the drift component may reflect union "equity" objectives, this influence has generally been noted in countries with centralized collective bargaining systems in which attempts by the labor movement to achieve greater equality in the structure of negotiated rates are thwarted by the subsequent behavior of drift."4 Such redistributional efforts are not as marked or as capable of coordination in a bargaining system as decentralized as that in the United States, where there are few barriers to reestablishing a perceived distributional anomaly through official union negotiations. The role of drift in the spillover process is therefore left for another paper. in which f(u) represents disequilibrium (market) forces and We represents the rate of change of expected money wages. Clearly, in a discussion of wage contagion, the determinants of expected wages are crucial, and the literature suggests three main influences on wage expectations. The most common hypothesis concerning wage expectations is that workers seek to maintain their real standard of living. This implies the specification Wt = g5(P_), where P is prices, which upon substitition into equation 2 yields the familiar price-wage process specified in most empirical wage-adjustment equations.
A second assumption is that workers seek to protect their share of total income and output. Virtually every organized labor movement advocates an increase in labor's share, and functional shares are apparently of importance in motivating wage demands in some European countries with relatively centralized bargaining arrangements.'5 However, from the perspective of negotiators of individual labor agreements in the decentralized bargaining system of the United States, macro distribution goals are a futile objective. On the other hand, profits in the firm or industry of the union do provide a realistic target, and thus profit variables have been included in many empirical models in an effort to detect the effects of institutional forces.
The third major expectations hypothesis, which has not received as much empirical attention as one might expect given the folklore of wage interdependence, is that union wage determination is influenced by notions of "fairness" or "equity" that are defined by reference to the wages received by other workers in the same union, by workers doing similar work in other industries, or by workers in other occupations with which a differential has been maintained by the force of custom. From this perspective, changes in the rate of inflation, in labor market conditions, or in institu-tional arrangements (for example, bargaining structures and contract durations) attain much of their importance in the inflationary process through their disturbing influence on the pattern of relative wages. Not only does the hypothesis open up an array of intersectoral relationships, in which wages determined by bargaining or competitive forces in one sector may influence wages elsewhere, but it opens up mechanisms through which government redistribution policies may be transmitted to sectors that are not directly influenced.'6 On the other hand, the hypothesis offers no guidance on the domain of wage interdependence. If future wage changes in sector i depend in part on the current wage in i relative to sector j, which sectors constitute j? If all sectors exert an equal influence, the naive contagion hypothesis reasserts itself, but this has been ruled out by results such as those reported in table 1. This problem is discussed more thoroughly when individual contract data are examined below.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Each of the hypotheses concerning wage expectations just discussed was incorporated into the empirical analysis reported below. The dependent variables were alternately the median percentage rate of change of money wages for union and for nonunion workers, as reported in the BLS surveys, Wage Developments in Manufacturing, described in the previous section. The dependent variable for the organized sector requires further comment. For union workers, the wage decisions are taken at the time of a contract renegotiation, so that the preferable dependent variable would be the annual rate of change of the value of the contract over its life. Unfortunately, data using this wage concept have not been available long enough for fruitful econometric analysis, and the same is true of data that include the value of fringe benefits. As an alternative measure of the outcome of current union negotiations, the rate of change of money wages provided for in the first year of currently negotiated contracts is adopted. This measure excludes first-year cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) and therefore captures wage responses to market and institutional influences exerted up to the negotiations. In the present analysis, this wage concept captures best the sensitivity of union wage decisions to current labor 16. Edward M. Gramlich, "Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Employment, and Family Incomes," BPEA, 2:1976, pp. 409-51. market conditions. To assess the drag on union wage adjustments attributable to the presence of multiyear contracts, the behavior of effective union wage changes-current wage changes plus deferred increases, plus COLA -is also analyzed and compared with the results for current changes. (A series restricted to deferred wage increases is not available.)
To get a period sufficiently long to permit useful analysis, one must rely on annual data. In the regression analysis, the wage changes are related to variables representing labor market pressure, price changes, profits, the incomes policy of the early seventies, and relative-wage comparisons, each of which is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
Turning first to the role of labor market pressure in wage determination in the organized sector, both the lag structure and the cyclical sensitivity of wage changes may differ from those in the nonunion sector. The lag structure of labor market influence may be affected by the duration of labor agreements. Labor market pressure may be a weak determinant of union bargaining demands for two reasons. First, in their bargaining behavior, unions are more interested in the employment of their current membership than in the potential size of their membership. Second, in an environment in which bargaining objectives are politically determined, and institutional rules indicate clearly which minority is at risk, the majority may rationally decide to ignore market pressures in their wage demands. In trial regressions the "Perry-weighted" series on the unemployment rate was tested in linear and nonlinear form as was an employment-change variable constructed by summing the rate of change of production-worker employment in each two-digit manufacturing sector weighted by the percent of union (or nonunion) workers in that sector. Statistically, it was not possible to choose between models with general and sector-specific labor market pressure in the analysis of union wage changes. The nonlinear unemployment and the weighted employment-change specifications were strongest in the union sector while the linear unemployment specification was superior in the nonunion sector. The unemployment specifications are reported for both sectors to facilitate comparisons. Despite considerable experimentation with lagged values of the variables reflecting labor market pressure in both the union and nonunion regressions, only the current values were significant.
Price changes are assumed to influence workers in all sectors equally, and the preceding December-to-December change of the consumer price index is used for this purpose. Experiments with alternative lag structures confirmed that the duration of employment contracts affects the time path of price influence on wages. First-year wage adjustments in currently negotiated union agreements are significantly influenced by price changes that occurred up to two years earlier, as would be expected when actual price changes differ from expected changes in a sector dominated by two-and three-year labor agreements. On the other hand, only one-year lags on price changes are significant in the nonunion sector (where wage revisions are generally considered annually). In the regressions on effective union wage change, lags of longer than one year are also insignificant. Deferred contractual wage increases appear to be based in part on price expectations at the time of negotiations that run counter to later price experience sufficiently to cancel the lagged influence on first-year negotiated wages.
The profit rate, as many have observed, is not an independent variable mandated by any derivation of disequilibrium wage adjustments in competitive markets. Instead, it has been offered as a determinant of union wage objectives in wage models that acknowledge some role for collective bargaining. But this convention has yielded puzzling results. The closer past studies have come to isolating wage adjustments for unionized workers, the weaker has been the role of profits.17 Nevertheless, the influence of profits on union wage changes was investigated in several unreported This specification assumes no change in the target differential over the estimating period. To the extent that union militancy is indexed by changes in union membership, as some previous studies have argued, this assumption is consistent with the facts in the private sector.
Nonunion employers may also wish to keep wages within a certain disstance of the union scale, in order to reduce the probability of union organization. As noted earlier, however, this effect may have been much weaker during the postwar period when further unionization in the private sector has not been extensive.
In the regression analysis presented below, the proportionate differentials between wages in unionized manufacturing and various reference sectors are used as variables for detecting spillover effects. The proportionate difference is calculated as 100 (log Wu -log WI), where Wu is the union wage in manufacturing and Wi is the wage in the reference sector. In the regressions for union wage changes, a negative coefficient is expected on all spillover variables, while the expected sign is positive in the regressions for nonunion wage changes. The union-nonunion differential, NU (RW in equation 3) is constructed from the data for manufacturing from Current Wage Developments referred to above. There are several alternative reference sectors for union-union wage spillovers, some of which have exhibited dramatic changes. Foremost among these is the relative increase of nonmanufacturing negotiated wages, which has been spearheaded by, but not restricted to, changes in construction wages. Data on negotiated rates in all nonmanufacturing are from Current Wage Developments and are used to construct the differential, NM, with union rates in manufacturing. The Bureau of Labor Statistics series on union wage rates in the building trades is also introduced as a separate reference wage and used to construct the differential, CON. Finally, the late sixties and early seventies saw a striking growth in unionization, collective bargaining, and the relative wage in the public sector. Yet there are surprisingly few time series on wages in the public sector. One of the few covers salaries of police and firemen in major metropolitan areas. The differential of this measure relative to union wage rates in manufacturing is f. Proportionate difference between union wage rates in manufacturing and indexed wage rates in the building trades (defined as above). g. Proportionate difference between union wage rates in manufacturing and the wages of public employees as indexed by the maximum salary scales of police and firemen (defined as above).
h. The value of the dummy variable is unity in 1972 and 1973 (the years of the incomes policy of the Nixon administration) and zero in other years. year or less. This conclusion follows from comparing the effect of labor market pressure on current and effective union wage changes (for example, regressions 1 and 6). The relationship between current union wage changes and labor market pressures, as indexed by the Perry weighted unemployment variable, is both economically and statistically significant, and the point estimate on the unemployment term is essentially the same as that obtained in the nonunion equation (regression 11 ). In the more comprehensive measure of effective union wages, which includes deferred increases, the point estimate of the response of union wages to unemployment is substantially lower and not quite statistically significant. Attempts to rehabilitate the influence of labor market pressures on effective union wage changes by the introduction of lagged values of unemployment did not change the results significantly. The burden of the evidence is that the impact of labor market disequilibrium is limited to firstyear wage changes in union agreements, but this impact approaches that observed in the nonunion sector of the industry. Indeed, the results imply that there is little difference between the two sectors in the response of current wage decisions to macroeconomic policy impacts on unemployment. Instead, union wage inflexibility is mainly a by-product of the duration of labor agreements.
This story is complicated to the extent that there are important wage interdependencies between sectors. If "customary" wage differentials are disturbed during business expansions, but the opportunities to restore them occur some years later when the labor agreements expire, the sensitivity of even current wage changes to unemployment may be offset by efforts to regain lost relative-wage positions. Regressions 3, 4, and 5 explore the relative-wage influence on first-year wage changes in current union settlements. Since the variables are defined as the (lagged) proportionate difference between the union wage in manufacturing on the one hand and, on the other, the wage in nonunion manufacturing, NU, unionized nonmanufacturing, NM, the building trades, CON, and the public sector, PUB, each taken separately, a negative coefficient is expected if wage interdependence exists.
Each ential added an upward pressure on union wages in manufacturing, despite the weaker influence of the interunion differentials. In the recession year of 1971, for example, the regression results imply that current union wage changes in manufacturing were around 2 percentage points higher than they would have been if the interunion differentials existing in 1969 had been maintained. During the recession in the early seventies, union wage interdependencies among major industrial sectors tended to counteract the effects of growing unemployment on negotiated wages in manufacturing, thereby adding significant wage inflexibility in the face of a weakening labor market. Only since 1972 and 1973 has the widening in major interunion differentials been halted or reversed, reducing spillover pressures among major sectors in the current recession.
What influence have these developments had on wages in the nonunion sector? Early in the paper it was noted that any tendency to dismiss the role of unions in the aggregate wage-determination process on the basis of their extent of organization of the labor force implies that "threat" effects, or wage spillovers from the union to the nonunion sector, are of minor importance. Money-wage increases in nonunion manufacturing for 1960-75 are analyzed in the regressions in the bottom panel of table 2. Given the definition of the union-nonunion wage differential in manufacturing, a significant positive coefficient would signify an operative threat effect. However, the spillover variable specified in the nonunion regressions does not approach normal standards of statistical significance. Over the period covered by the analysis, union wages in manufacturing do not appear to have influenced wage increases in nonunion manufacturing. (When the components of NU are entered separately in the nonunion regression, the union reference wage is negative and not statistically significant, confirming the absence of significant spillovers from the nonunion sector.) The absence of a discernible threat effect is perhaps unsurprising during a period in which private-sector organizing has not been very extensive or successful. And if there is no spillover from union to nonunion wages, as this result suggests, there is some question of the efficacy of wage-restraint programs that assume that the union sector is the leader in the general money-wage dynamics of the economy. Whatever the role of wage contagion among union jurisdictions, the infection apparently has not reached nonunion workers by a direct route in recent years. The regressions in table 2 incorporate a dummy variable (PHASE) to test for the effect of the incomes policy of the Nixon administration in 1972 and 1973. While this represents a rather crude test of the policy's impact on the wage-adjustment process, limitations in the data preclude some alternatives. Nevertheless, two interesting findings emerge from a review of the PHASE coefficients. First, the policy appears to have restrained negotiated wages, but this effect is clear only in those equations that explicitly account for the influence of relative-wage disequilibria on union wages (equations 3, 4, and 5 in table 2).25 One interpretation of this is that Phases II and III apparently had some success in suppressing union wage expectations generated by the disturbed relative-wage differentials of the late sixties. Second, the PHASE coefficients indicate that nonunion wage changes were significantly higher during the policy period. The PHASE coefficients in the union regressions are sensitive to the particular reference-wage comparisons used and in some of the regressions look large relative to inferences that others have drawn from studies of earnings behavior. These observations raise the possibility that important structural changes occurred in wage determination during the period. To explore this issue further, wage-change relationships for the union and nonunion sectors were reestimated for the period 1960-71 and used to predict wage changes in 1972 and 1973. For the union wage concepts, regressions including spillovers from nonunion manufacturing and unionized nonmanufacturing are used for the predictions. No relative-wage influence is included in the nonunion regression. The predicted wage movements are compared with actual changes in table 3.
For unionized manufacturing, wage increases were significantly below predicted values, and for 1972 the dominant effect appears to have been the restraint of first-year increases. Nevertheless, there is a striking differ- case for such a policy often starts with presumed wage inflexibility in the unionized sector. While this assumption is confirmed in the analysis of effective union wage changes (which, as the broadest measure of annual union wage changes, may be the concept of primary concern to policy officials), the inflexibility appears to result from the long duration of labor agreements rather than from the insulation of current union wage settlements from market influences. In the nonunion sector, one finds the greatest degree of wage flexibility and presumably the greatest chance that a guideline policy might induce distortions. Moreover, nonunion wage flexibility is not tempered by spillovers from the union sector; within manufacturing the significant wage interdependencies flow from nonunion wages to union wages. Finally, the results reported in table 3 raise the possibility that during a recession a guideline approach may have perverse impacts on sectors with relatively flexible wages. As noted above, the effects of unemployment and prices on wages in the union sector can be dampened by the effects of relative-wage disequilibria, and this may itself be advanced as a justification for incomes policy. The effects of disequilibria appear to be real, but it is unclear whether the guideline approach eliminates them or merely postpones them for another day.27 PREDICTIONS FOR 1974 AND 1975 In this section the behavior of union and nonunion wages in the current recession is compared with the wage increases predicted by alternative wage-adjustment models. This is done by reestimating various models of wage determination for 1960-73, and using them to predict wages changes in 1974 To summarize, this section has focused on differences between the wageadjustment process in the nonunion sector of manufacturing, typified by annual wage decisions, and the unionized sector, in which the wages of about 99 percent of the workers are specified in multiyear labor agreements. In some important respects the two sectors are similar, most notably in the influence of labor market pressure on current wage decisions. Nevertheless, average union wage changes are insulated from the current market pressures by the inertia imposed by multiyear contracts, and even the redicated that their statistical properties were inferior to the structural models that were presented in table 2. sponse of currently negotiated union wages to these pressures may be dampened by their response to important relative-wage relations. At the beginning of the seventies, disequilibria in their relative wages were quite large by postwar standards, and they have become an increasingly strong, although far from monolithic, influence on union-wage determination during the decade. Simultaneously, the direct influence of prices on contractual wages appears to have diminished in the latest years. The net result of these changes is that while the wage interdependence model appears to identify important influences on uinion wage determination, and to provide a superior explanation of union wage movements over particular historical periods, the importance of these influences has been shifting, altering the estimated structure of the wage relation and making its predictive performance inferior to that of simpler alternatives. For the nonunion sector, where wage determination appears uninfluenced by spillover pressures, such structural change has been negligible.
Wage Imitation among Major Collective Bargaining Agreements
This section deals with the nature of wage interrelationships among major collective bargaining agreements. The notion that wage linkages within the organized sector are sufficiently strong that most unions and employers agree to "follow the pattern" grew out of a series of virtually identical wage rounds in the immediate postwar period, when most major unions renegotiated their contracts on an annual basis. In the intervening twentyfive years the contractual arrangements of the collective bargaining system have acquired sufficient diversity (for example, in duration of agreement and cost-of-living coverage) that maintaining such rigid patterns would be difficult even in the absence of differential market influences. Yet popular belief in the persistence of such patterns continues.30
Institutionally determined wage imitation is not proved by demonstrating that patterns of wage similarity exist in the economy. As noted earlier, many "wage patterns" would be expected in an economy without unions, and some institutional developments may simply codify practices and outcomes that would have been observed even in their absence. Although institutional codification and institutional rigidity are not always easy to distinguish, some of the more commonly cited "patterns" appear to fall within the former category.
Consider multi-employer negotiating arrangements. These represent a centralization of wage determination that would not exist in an unorganized labor market, and may influence the size of wage increases. At the same time multi-employer bargaining structures represent the ultimate codification of an interfirm wage pattern, and hence the ultimate potential for institutional wage rigidity. Where are they found? A key feature of U.S. collective bargaining arrangements is that centralized bargaining structures are found mainly in markets in which substantial variation in wage movements would be unlikely in the absence of unions. Where they are observed, they most frequently involve locally or regionally competitive product markets. In this sense they often represent the institutionalization of wage similarity that would have existed under competitive forces. Most multi-employer bargaining occurs outside of manufacturing; over 90 percent of unionized workers in construction, hotels and restaurants, whole- The wage patterns described above are limited to domains in which market forces would also breed substantial similarity in wage changes. The subsequent analysis focuses on the extent to which these contracts interact to establish much broader patterns of wage imitation. The approach taken is similar to that in the previous section. Wage adjustments in prominent labor agreements in several major industries depend by hypothesis on the employment opportunities for union workers, past price changes, and the relative wage in other major contracts. Each of the collective bargaining situations studied yields settlements that are characteristic of the pattern followed within that industry, and regression analysis is used to test for wage interdependence among major collective bargaining agreements.
The analysis of individual contracts complicates the organization of the regression analysis. Observations should correspond to actual decisions, and in the present context the relevant decision is the settlement of negotiations over contract terms. By this measure, the interval between observations has changed over the postwar period as the duration of collective bargaining agreements has lengthened. This development forces choices concerning the appropriate definition of variables and greatly reduces the number of observations available for the analysis of each contract. Pooling the data from different contracts would obscure the channels of wage interdependence that are the focus of the study. In one important case, automobiles, the existence of multiyear contracts throughout the postwar period means too few observations for sensible regression analysis. (This does not, however, preclude tests of the effect of auto workers' wages on labor agreements in other industries.)
The specification of these regressions generally follows that of the preceding section, but now each observation is a contract agreement. The dependent variable is the average annual percentage change in the contractual wage rate over the life of the contract, and includes initial, deferred, and cost-of-living wage adjustments. The Bureau of Labor Statistics' Wage Chronology series, from which the data are gathered, evaluates the overall wage change in absolute terms, and generally provides a time series of wage-rate information only for selected occupations covered by each con- tract. Therefore, the percentage change of wages of unskilled workers is used in the regression analysis. Employment prospects of union members are represented by the average annual percentage change in employment of production workers over the life of the previous contract in the industry that corresponds most closely with the coverage of the contract. The rate of change of consumer prices is also measured as an annual average over the life of the previous contract. The specification is complicated by the intermittent presence of formulas for cost-of-living allowances in collective bargaining agreements. When a COLA arrangement is operative, contractual wage increases, as defined above, should be influenced by current, rather than past, price changes. Thus, when an existing contract included a COLA, the current price change was entered as an explanatory variable.
Two hypotheses concerning the nature of negotiated wage imitations were examined. The first was the target-relative-wage hypothesis advanced in the preceding section. The second assumed that unions seek to approximate recent settlements in other industries, irrespective of the current relative-wage position of the industries.
In the end, the tests for the effects of recent settlements were not successful and are not reported. The variables representing wage changes provided by recently concluded negotiations in other sectors were not significant and the signs on the coefficients varied from agreement to agreement. It may be that this hypothesis cannot be tested with available data. As one examines the postwar history of major collective bargaining relationships, it becomes clear that even if the hypothesis has merit, the resulting wage patterns may be too complex and too unstable from negotiation to negotiation to be captured adequately by regression analysis. As labor agreements of different durations have developed, negotiations in industry i will first lead and then lag negotiations in industry j. A strike or a modest change in the expiration date of a labor agreement can also disturb a traditional leader-follower pattern.
The remaining discussion focuses on the target-relative-wage hypothesis. The relative-wage variables take the same form as in the preceding section with the exception that they now represent the proportional difference in the wage of unskilled workers in sectors i and j prior to negotiations in sector i. The influence of wages in the steel and auto industries relative to others is examined for each contract, since these are frequently asserted to be key bargains that set wage patterns for the economy. The effect of the generally growing differential in favor of the building trades is also examined for each contract. The other interactions tested were chosen on a more judgmental basis.
The results of the analysis of disequilibrium relative-wage influences among major union agreements are reported in table 6. Only the coefficients on the relative-wage variables appear in the table. Given the limited degrees of freedom available in a world of multiyear agreements, each coefficient was estimated from a separate regression in which the other variables included were the rates of change of prices and industry employment, as defined above. The performance of the unreported variables was mixed, with the expected positive coefficients on the employment and price-change variables attaining significance for only a minority of the bargaining relationships studied.
The role of the relative-wage disequilibria in major contract settlements is also uneven. While the point estimates reported in table 6 suggest that a falling wage relative to other unions will increase wage pressures in collective bargaining, few of the relationships are statistically significant and some coefficients are too small to be of economic significance. There is some evidence that relative-wage disequilibria are most influential across agreements negotiated by a single union (for example, the Steelworkers in steel and aluminum; the Automobile Workers in automobiles and aerospace), a finding that accords with discussions in the institutional literature. There are also some erratic channels of influence from union wages in the building trades.
My own view is that the results in this section are reasonably suggestive that relative-wage disequilibria play a significant role in wage determination in many collective bargaining relationships, and that the statistical significance of many of these influences will become clearer as the number of observations increases. However, this is quite different from the view that there are wage patterns that are so comprehensive and rigid that once a "key" negotiation is concluded, wage changes are essentially determined for major sectors of the organized economy. The evidence in tables 1 and 6 is consistent in indicating that this view is simply too strong. Indeed, many of the wage patterns that develop in collective bargaining appear rather fluid, with shifting channels of influence. One important topic for future work is the discovery of what influences such changes in the imitative patterns among unions.
Summary
The focus of this paper has been the sources of differential wage flexibility in union and nonunion labor markets in manufacturing. That differences in the cyclical sensitivity of average union and nonunion wage changes exist is clear in the postwar data. However, it is also clear that firstyear negotiated wage changes are almost as sensitive to labor market pressure as nonunion wages. Most of the inertia in negotiated wages is a byproduct of multiyear labor agreements. In some periods, a disequilibrium between union wages in manufacturing and wages in the nonunion sector or in other unionized firms has been important in current negotiated wage decisions, muting the influence of the current labor market situation. Such relative-wage effects boosted union manufacturing settlements in the early seventies, and appear to have held them down in 1974-75, when rapid increases in the CPI led to predictions of union settlements even larger than those that occurred.
In general both the duration of labor agreements and relative-wage disequilibria may reduce the immediate influence of standard monetary and fiscal policies on money wages in parts of the organized sector. On the other hand, the importance of wage contagion is limited. The greatest impact of some highly visible collective bargaining settlements is on other agreements negotiated by the same union rather than on union wages more generally. Union wage movements in different industries vary considerably. And, more important, union wage gains do not appear to leak out into the nonunion sector where wages are lower and more flexible.
One consequence of labor markets with different degrees of wage flexibility is that a guideline approach to incomes policy may raise as well as lower wage increases when applied during a recession. Although the policy may succeed in reducing wages where they are least flexible, it may result in higher wage changes in the flexible-wage sector than otherwise would have been observed. The nonunion sector in 1972 and 1973 appears to be a case in point, with wages there rising faster than would have been expected on the basis of existing market conditions. This finding suggests that any direct policy interventions into labor markets should take full account of the differing wage flexibility in different markets, and the behavior of wages that would therefore be expected in the absence of such intervention.
Comments and Discussion
Charles C. Holt: This paper probably offers the best explanation yet of the rather puzzling fluctuation in the union-nonunion wage differential. Earlier discussions of the topic usually stressed a simple dynamic lag in union wages, but this paper goes further both in modeling the way the differentials change cyclically and in determining their size in a steady state.
The basis for Flanagan's argument is his assertion that it is generally cheaper for a firm to maintain its relative position by imitating the wage changes of reference firms in relevant product and labor markets. Although this seems a reasonable proposition, I know of no body of theory or of evidence to support it, and I believe Flanagan should have given us a fuller treatment than he did. Table 1 reports a striking change in the coefficient of variation of wage changes through time, whose sources pose a question. I think there is other evidence, over a longer period of time, that indicates that such changes are strongly cyclical. But the large reductions in the coefficient of variation from 1961 to 1975 for both the union and nonunion sectors suggest that they are structural; and the same could be said of the rising trend in the standard deviations. Finding such trends could be significant.
The basic theoretical specification for the union sector is stated in terms of wage differentials. This is an area that is undeveloped, both theoretically and empirically, and Flanagan is to be commended for having opened it up. Certainly, introducing a differential between the sector that he is examining and other reference sectors as an explanatory variable is a reasonable way to go. It might also be interesting to explore some other variables: One is the change in this differential. If the differential is actually getting wider it would have an even greater effect on bargaining behavior. This effect might be captured as a nonlinear trans-674 action term or explicitly as the change in the differential. Another is the change in wages of the reference group. Flanagan uses differences between two wage levels, but bargaining in the union sector may actually be strongly influenced by a big wage increase in the nonunion sector in the previous year.
Since the nonunion sector responds strongly to unemployment and general market conditions, putting nonunion wage changes as an explanatory variable into the union wage-change equation obviously imposes a strong collinearity problem; it might be better to use the deviation from the nonunion wage to try to sort out whether unemployment was having its impact directly on union bargaining, or indirectly through the nonunion sector.
Because of this collinearity problem, Flanagan restricts the number of these differentials in table 2. In effect, he puts them in one at a time, or at most two at a time. He shows that these differentials substantially reduce the residual error. One could look at R2 and see if using all of the differentials helped at all. If it did, that would suggest a search for a theoretical and econometric specification for taking into account the multiple differential impacts. Figure 1 shows the various differentials that are used as explanatory variables. It would have been interesting to plot these differentials weighted by their regression coefficients so as to see not only how the various explanatory variables move, but also how much each contributes to union wage changes.
In the comparisons of predictive performance in table 5, it is disconcerting that in three out of the four cases for the union equations the autoregressive equations perform better than the basic model. This may be related to the need for an alternative specification that I suggested earlier. If the wage changes in the previous year in the nonunion sector do, in fact, heavily influence current collective bargaining, that might explain why these autoregressive equations perform as well as they do.
Flanagan does talk about the policy implications of his results as they relate to guidelines. The strong carryover effects that he finds from nonmanufacturing unions into the manufacturing sector certainly raise the question about what kind of intervention is called for. The very sharp leveling off of the differential for the construction industry apparently held down wages elsewhere as well; this effect ought to be called the "Dunlop-era impact."
The policy implications with regard to the differential on an industryby-industry basis should be pursued further. For instance, since the competitive sector has a strong impact in establishing the nonunion differential which in turn influences union wages, improving the operation of the competitive sector through measures such as manpower programs ought to yield broad anti-inflation benefits.
In concentrating on the union-nonunion differential, Flanagan has omitted many important factors affecting industrial demand and labor supply. While his strategy certainly is understandable at this stage of the work, later refinements should include these factors.
Barry Bosworth: I believe that Bob Flanagan should be congratulated for writing a paper on wage behavior that is not another attempt to fit the aggregate measure of nonfarm compensation per manhour. This is an interesting paper that, by distinguishing between changes in negotiated and nonnegotiated wage rates, develops several significant hypotheses. I discovered several major themes from the study.
First, there is evidence of interdependence among union wage settlements, but no such spillover effects are apparent in the nonunion sector.
Second, the apparent lesser sensitivity to current market conditions of manufacturing union wage rates compared to nonunion wage rates is a result of multiyear contracting in the union sector; first-year settlements are responsive to labor markets just as nonunion wages are.
Third, the incorporation of a wage-wage view of the inflation process sharply reduces the estimated direct effect of prices on wages.
Fourth, wage-price controls or guidelines may put a floor under wage increases in some sectors at the same time that they restrain wages in others.
Fifth, all the structural models of union wages underpredict the increases of 1975.
Finally, there are no fixed leader-follower wage patterns in union settlements.
I would like to focus my comments, first, around the statistical results reported in tables 2 through 5. The argument that current union settlements and nonunion wage changes are equally sensitive to market conditions is based on the nearly identical structure of equations 1 and 11 in table 2. Equation 2 with a reciprocal of the unemployment rate is actually All this leads me to wonder whether the equations for current wage adjustments are, in fact, stable enough functions to permit generalizations about the behavior of union wages. Certainly, on the basis of the results of table 4, one would not have concluded that union wages under new contracts respond to market conditions in a fashion similar to nonunion wages.
Flanagan's argument that wage guideposts under the Pay Board induced higher settlements in the nonunion sector is interesting but puzzling. How is it that this sector seems to be insensitive to spillover effects from the union sector, yet is sharply affected by a government announcement of a target? In addition, why was there no apparent effect in 1962-66 but a strong effect in 1972-73?
The distribution of these wage adjustments in 1972-73 reveals some interesting characteristics. First, median adjustments rose in 1972 relative mination in the nonunionized sector. He also noted that lagged unemployment and inflation variables had not displaced the relative-wage variables in regressions and that the lagged unemployment variables had always been statistically insignificant.
William Poole reasoned that the relative-wage terms could be serving as proxies for price expectations, filling this purpose better than the lagged price terms that were also tried in the equation. Other discussants suggested alternative explanatory variables that might establish whether the relative-wage terms truly represented imitative effects or were proxies for other effects. Christopher Sims, noting that the autoregressive equations have performed relatively well in projecting wage changes, argued for exploring that type of model along with the relative-wage terms in order to pin down the structural role of the latter.
Martin Feldstein was concerned that the dependent variable might be misspecified since current wage changes omitted increases arising from cost-of-living allowances, fringe benefits, and merit pay increases. Robert Gordon voiced surprise that Flanagan's reported price coefficients were small enough that the Phillips curve had a substantial negative slope in the long run, contrary to his own and others' recent research findings. He noted that the price coefficients might be biased downward both by the omissions Feldstein had pointed out in the dependent variable and by the use of the consumer price index as an independent variable rather than a measure of producer prices. The latter effect would be particularly noticeable in 1974 and 1975, when increases in import and food prices were so large and were never fully incorporated into wages. He pointed out that wage equations would overpredict in 1974 and 1975, as Flanagan's do, if the CPI were indeed not the structurally appropriate price variable.
Franco Modigliani was skeptical about the conclusion that the union and nonunion sectors were comparably responsive both to labor market conditions and to inflation. In his own research, he had found that, compared to nonunion wages, union wages were more responsive to inflation and less responsive to unemployment. He noted that the equations Flanagan fitted through 1973 also showed this characteristic.
Regarding his choice of dependent variables, Flanagan emphasized that the paper seeks to explain the behavior of contractual rates in the union and nonunion sectors and therefore the results would not necessarily be expected to parallel findings from studies of earnings or total compensation. Indeed, a comparison of studies based on these alternative wage concepts provides some clues to the behavior and role of wage drift in the economy. The present regression results on contractual settlements indicate that workers are fooled in their contractual negotiations, and data on the different gains of workers with and without COLA provisions in their contracts do not overturn this perception. The behavior of wage drift, which links contractual wages to actual earnings, is strongly related to price inflation and may reconcile this paper with studies of earnings that identify a natural unemployment rate.
